Architectural Patterns for Agent Runtime Governance

A Technical Companion to NIST NCCoE Concept Paper: *Accelerating the Adoption of Software and AI Agent Identity and Authorization*

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Purpose

This document offers architectural sequence diagrams as a starting point for discussion on how existing identity and authorization standards might be applied to AI agents at runtime. It is intended as a technical companion to the NCCoE concept paper, addressing each of the six areas of interest with implementation patterns that we hope the broader community can evaluate, challenge, refine, and build upon.

The patterns presented here represent one perspective on how standards like OAuth 2.0, OIDC, SPIFFE/SPIRE, SCIM, NGAC, AuthZEN, MCP, and A2A might compose into an agent governance architecture. We do not claim to have definitive answers — the challenges of agent identity and authorization are complex and will benefit from the diverse expertise of the NCCoE community. Rather, we offer these diagrams as concrete artifacts to ground discussion and invite collaboration on areas where our thinking may be incomplete or where alternative approaches may be stronger.

Taken together, these architectural patterns suggest the emergence of a new control plane layer — **Agent Runtime Governance (ARG)** — responsible for governing agent identity, authority, delegation, and lifecycle behavior at runtime. The document also identifies potential governance gaps in both MCP (agent-to-tool) and A2A (agent-to-agent) protocols — the two complementary standards that define the full interaction surface for AI agents — as areas where community-driven work may be particularly valuable.

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Responses to NCCoE Areas of Interest

The following summarizes our perspective on each of the six areas identified in the concept paper. Detailed architectural patterns and sequence diagrams for each area follow in the numbered sections below.

Identification

How should AI agents be identified in enterprise environments?

We suggest that agents require stable, cryptographically verifiable identity that is independent of the human who invoked them and the model that powers them. This means treating agents as first-class workloads with their own identity lifecycle — not as extensions of a user's session or a service account's permissions. In Sections 1 and 2, we illustrate how existing standards (SPIFFE/SPIRE for workload identity, OIDC for authentication, SCIM for lifecycle provisioning) can compose to provide continuous discovery of agents across heterogeneous infrastructure, cryptographic attestation of their properties, and automated registration in a trusted registry. We believe the community would benefit from discussing how agent identity should relate to — but remain distinct from — the identity of the human who authorized the agent's actions.

Authorization

How should AI agents be authorized to access resources and take actions?

Traditional authorization models (RBAC, PBAC, ABAC) were designed for humans and assume intent. We propose that agent authorization benefits from an additional layer: declared purpose, goals, and intent that are validated against the actual action on every request. Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate intent-based authorization through a deterministic control plane — infrastructure that sits outside the agent and evaluates every action against formal policy (Cedar, OPA, Rego). The control plane produces the same decision for the same inputs every time, in contrast to LLM-interpreted governance rules that may vary with context. We welcome discussion on how intent taxonomies should be standardized and whether existing authorization standards like AuthZEN can be extended to support agent-specific context.

Access Delegation

How should authority flow when agents delegate tasks to other agents?

When an orchestrator agent delegates to sub-agents, we suggest that authority should narrow at every hop — never widen. Section 3 demonstrates cryptographic delegation chains where each link is signed, scope-narrowed, and time-bound. Section 11 extends this to multi-agent coordination, where all inter-agent communication flows through governed, audited channels. We also identify this as an area where the A2A protocol could benefit from governance extensions: delegation chain propagation, scope narrowing requirements, and chain-of-custody verification. We would value the community's input on how these extensions might be standardized.

Logging and Transparency

How should agent actions be logged for auditability and transparency?

Every sequence diagram in this document includes an Audit Log participant — by design, not as an afterthought. We suggest that agent audit records need richer context than traditional access logs: not just "who accessed what" but "under what authority, for what declared purpose, at what point in the agent's plan, and with what delegation chain." Section 6 (Plan-Act-Observe) demonstrates lifecycle-aware audit trails that capture not just individual actions but the arc of planning, acting, and observing — enabling forensic analysis that reconstructs *why* an agent did what it did, not just *what* it did.

Section 14 introduces **Execution Lineage** — a tree-structured audit model where every agent action is a node connected by delegation, action, and resource-access edges. Lineage enables complete reconstruction of multi-agent execution chains: from the originating user through every delegation hop, every policy decision, every tool call, to the downstream resource access. We believe the community would benefit from discussing how execution lineage identifiers should be standardized and propagated across trust boundaries, particularly in multi-vendor agent environments.

Data Flow Tracking

How should data flows be tracked and governed as data moves through agent systems?

Agents accumulate context — conversation history, tool results, user data — that is rarely treated as a governed data store. Section 12 demonstrates memory governance with classification, tenant isolation, retention policies, and deletion rights. Section 8 addresses credential flows through a capability token model where agents never hold raw credentials. Together, these patterns ensure that data provenance is tracked as data moves between agents, tools, and memory stores. We see this as an area where existing data governance frameworks may need adaptation for the agent context, and we welcome the community's perspective on how to bridge these domains.

Prompt Injection Mitigation

How should agent architectures defend against prompt injection?

We believe the most durable defense against prompt injection is architectural rather than model-level: designing systems so that even a fully compromised model cannot take unauthorized action. Section 13 demonstrates two complementary layers — content-level guardrails that use policy-as-code (Rego) to detect and block injection patterns before content reaches the LLM, and action-level governance that enforces six independent barriers (action

whitelisting, intent-action validation, delegation chain scope, credential isolation, goal boundaries, behavioral detection) after the LLM responds. This "containment over prevention" approach bounds the blast radius of a successful injection to the agent's current authority grant. We recognize that prompt injection defense is an active area of research and welcome discussion on how architectural and model-level defenses should complement each other in reference designs.

Agent Runtime Governance as the Missing Layer

Enterprise identity and access management (IAM) is mature, well-standardized, and essential. OIDC authenticates users. SPIFFE/SPIRE provides workload identity. SCIM provisions and deprovisions accounts. OAuth issues scoped tokens. These standards will remain foundational for any agent governance architecture — nothing proposed here replaces them.

However, AI agents introduce a category of runtime governance challenges that existing IAM infrastructure was not designed to address. A traditional service authenticates once and executes a fixed code path. An AI agent authenticates once and then *reasons* — dynamically planning multi-step operations, adapting its approach based on intermediate results, delegating tasks to other agents, and accessing different resources with different intents across its lifecycle. The governance questions that arise are not about identity. They are about behavior: Should this agent perform this specific action, right now, given its declared purpose, its current goal, its position in a multi-agent delegation chain, and the authority grant that is active at this moment?

Traditional IAM verifies who an agent is. Agent Runtime Governance verifies whether the agent should perform a specific action right now.

Specifically, IAM does not fully address:

- **Dynamic planning and per-action authorization.** Agents construct and revise multi-step plans at runtime. Each action in the plan requires authorization against the current policy, the current authority grant, and the current lifecycle phase — not a static permission set established at authentication time.
- **Delegated authority across agents.** When an orchestrator delegates to sub-agents, the authority chain ideally narrows at every hop, is cryptographically verifiable, and expires independently. Traditional token scoping was not designed for multi-hop agent delegation with scope narrowing.
- **Changing intent across lifecycle phases.** An agent's declared intent shifts as it moves through plan-act-observe cycles — from research to analysis to content generation.

Authorization decisions that were correct for the agent's initial intent may not be correct for its current phase.

- **Memory and state governance.** Agents accumulate context that persists across actions and may be shared across agents. This accumulated state requires classification, tenant isolation, retention policies, and deletion rights — data governance concerns that sit outside traditional IAM.
- **Containment of prompt injection consequences.** A compromised model can generate arbitrary action requests. A governance layer that ensures even a fully compromised model cannot take unauthorized action — a containment guarantee that operates independently of the identity layer — may prove essential for enterprise deployments.

These architectural patterns suggest the emergence of a new control plane layer — **Agent Runtime Governance (ARG)** — responsible for governing agent identity, authority, delegation, and lifecycle behavior at runtime.

ARG is not a replacement for IAM. It is a compositional layer that consumes identity signals from existing IAM infrastructure and applies runtime-specific governance that IAM alone does not provide. The diagram below illustrates this relationship: the Enterprise Identity Plane provides foundational identity services; the ARG Layer adds the runtime governance capabilities specific to autonomous agents; and the Agent Execution Environment operates under the governance of both.



This layered view is intentional. Every component in the ARG Layer depends on the Enterprise Identity Plane for foundational identity signals — agent identities are provisioned via SCIM,

authenticated via OIDC, and attested via SPIFFE. What the ARG Layer adds is the runtime evaluation: intent validation, per-action policy evaluation, delegation chain verification, credential brokering, and lifecycle-aware audit. These are the capabilities that the sequence diagrams in this document demonstrate in detail.

We offer this framing as a contribution to the NCCoE community's thinking about how to structure reference architectures for agent governance. Whether the community converges on the term "Agent Runtime Governance" or adopts different terminology, we believe the architectural distinction between identity-time governance and runtime governance will prove useful as the field matures.

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1. End-to-End Agent Governance Flow

This diagram shows the complete lifecycle of a governed agent operation — from user request through identity verification, delegation chain creation, intent-based authorization, deterministic control plane execution, secrets brokering, MCP tool governance, and audit logging.



2. Agent Identity Lifecycle: Discovery, Attestation, and Registration

The end-to-end flow above assumes agents are already registered with verified identities. This section addresses how that identity is established in the first place — through continuous infrastructure discovery, cryptographic attestation, and SCIM-based lifecycle management.

In enterprise environments, agents and the tools they depend on (MCP servers, APIs, services) are deployed across heterogeneous infrastructure — Kubernetes clusters, Docker containers, cloud services, and local development environments. Rather than relying on manual registration, a discovery-driven approach can continuously detect agents and tool servers as they appear, attest their properties cryptographically, and register them in a trusted registry that the governance infrastructure depends on.

This approach may help address several challenges the NCCoE concept paper identifies around agent identification: How do you establish identity for agents that are dynamically deployed? How do you maintain an accurate inventory as infrastructure changes? How do you detect unregistered agents operating outside governance?



3. Delegation Chain Creation and Validation

Shows how authority flows from a human authorizer through orchestrator agents to worker agents, with scope narrowing at every link.

A2A Protocol Context: The A2A (Agent-to-Agent) protocol — an open specification with broad industry participation — standardizes how agents delegate tasks to other agents. A2A enables a client agent to discover remote agents via Agent Cards, send tasks, and receive results. As A2A matures, the community may benefit from considering governance extensions: delegation chain propagation, scope narrowing requirements, cryptographic chain-of-custody, and constraints preventing a remote agent from exceeding the client agent's authority. The diagram below illustrates governance controls that could complement A2A's delegation model for enterprise deployments.



4. Intent-Based Authorization

Authorization models built for humans — RBAC, PBAC, ABAC — assume intent. When an employee queries the customer database, the organization assumes there's a business reason. Human judgment and accountability provide a natural governance layer. Agents operate differently — they follow instructions and model weights without the contextual judgment that humans bring to access decisions.

This suggests that effective agent authorization may require the agent to **declare** why it's acting, with infrastructure that **enforces** alignment between the declaration and the actual action. In this model, every agent invocation declares three architecturally distinct things:

Purpose is the agent's reason for being — stable across sessions, defined at deployment time. A market research agent's purpose is market research. Purpose sets the outer boundary of everything the agent is allowed to do and is the first filter in any authorization decision.

Goal is a time-boxed business objective with measurable boundaries, created per-task and expired when complete. When a user asks a research agent to analyze competitor pricing for Q1, the goal has a defined scope (competitor pricing data), a time boundary (Q1 analysis), action limits (maximum number of queries), and an expiration (task completes or TTL expires). Goals prevent scope creep and runaway agents. Goals also support hierarchies — a parent goal can spawn sub-goals, each with narrower scope and shorter TTL.

Intent is the most granular declaration — what the agent is doing right now, categorized into a standard taxonomy:

Intent Category	Risk Level	Example
Research	Low	Querying public data sources
Data Analysis	Low-Medium	Running aggregations on internal data
Content Generation	Medium	Producing reports, documents, summaries
Customer Interaction	Medium	Responding to support tickets
Code Generation	Medium-High	Writing or modifying source code
External Integration	High	Calling third-party APIs
System Administration	High	Modifying configurations, managing access
Data Modification	High	Writing to production databases
Emergency Access	Critical	Break-glass operations

Intent changes as the agent progresses through its plan. Each transition is a governance checkpoint. The same agent, with the same identity and the same permissions, gets **different authorization decisions based on what it's doing right now**. If the declared intent doesn't match the actual action, the policy engine catches it — the action doesn't execute.

Declaration without enforcement has limited value. In this architecture, the runtime governance infrastructure evaluates every action against the full context: agent identity, declared purpose, active goal (with scope, action limits, and TTL), current intent category, the specific action being requested, and the delegation chain that authorized the operation. A permit decision requires alignment across all of these. A mismatch at any level results in a deny or escalation.

4.1. Intent-Based Authorization Scenarios

Shows how the same agent, with the same identity, receives different authorization decisions based on declared intent — permit, escalate, or deny.



4.2. Intent Transitions Across Agent Lifecycle

Shows how an agent's intent changes as it progresses through its plan, with each transition serving as a governance checkpoint that adjusts authorization dynamically.



5. Deterministic Control Plane

A common approach to governing AI agents today places governance logic inside the agent itself — system prompts with access restrictions, instructions to check permissions before acting, or framework-level self-checks. A challenge with this approach is that **the subject of governance becomes the enforcer of governance.**

When governance lives inside the agent, the governance logic is processed by the same LLM that processes everything else. This introduces several risks: prompt injection can bypass it;

probabilistic reasoning provides no formal guarantee of compliance; the agent simulates a permission check rather than performing one against a policy engine; context window saturation can degrade governance instructions over time; and model updates may silently change enforcement behavior. These challenges appear to be inherent to having governance processed by the same probabilistic system that processes everything else, suggesting value in an architecturally separate enforcement layer.

A **deterministic control plane** is infrastructure that sits between the agent and the systems it accesses. It intercepts every action the agent attempts, evaluates it against policy using a deterministic engine (Cedar, OPA, Rego, or equivalent), and returns a decision: **permit**, **deny**, or **escalate**. The evaluation uses formal policy languages with well-defined semantics — not natural language, not LLM-interpreted rules — producing the same output for the same input every time.

We propose that a deterministic control plane should satisfy five properties: **(1) Inline** — every request passes through it; agents architecturally cannot bypass it. **(2) Deterministic** — policy evaluation produces the same result for the same inputs every time. **(3) Contextual** — it evaluates the full governance context: identity, declared purpose, goal, intent, authority grant, and the specific action requested. **(4) Fail-closed** — if the control plane is unavailable, the default is deny; agents do not fall back to ungoverned operation. **(5) Independent** — it operates outside the agent's trust boundary; the agent cannot modify its policies or influence its decisions.

The control plane can reach the agent through two complementary integration models. The **Governance Proxy** requires zero agent modification — agent requests pass through a transparent proxy that performs policy evaluation, credential injection, response scrubbing, and audit logging. This may be particularly useful for governing existing agents, third-party agents, and agents built on frameworks that cannot be modified. The **Governance SDK** integrates directly into the agent's runtime, providing a constraint manifest upfront, preflight authorization checks before each action, and rich execution context propagation (goal, intent, workflow position, originating orchestrator) that enables more precise policy decisions with fewer false denials. In practice, organizations may benefit from using both — the proxy as a universal baseline, the SDK where richer governance context justifies the integration.

5.1. Control Plane Core: Validation Pipeline

Shows the architectural separation between LLM reasoning (non-deterministic) and action execution (deterministic). The LLM proposes — the control plane validates and executes.



5.2. Two Integration Models: Proxy and SDK

Shows how the deterministic control plane reaches agents through two complementary paths — a transparent governance proxy (zero agent modification) and an embedded governance SDK (rich context propagation). Both use the same policy engine and audit trail.



6. Plan-Act-Observe Lifecycle Governance

Many agent governance approaches operate at the action level — each tool invocation is evaluated independently. While necessary, this may be insufficient on its own. Action-level evaluation answers "is this specific action authorized?" but may not address the questions that arise with autonomous agents operating over time: Has the agent's behavior drifted from its declared purpose? Has its plan expanded beyond its original scope? Does the sequence of individually-authorized actions, taken together, constitute something that was never approved?

An agent typically doesn't execute a single action. It plans an approach, takes a first step, observes the result, revises its plan, takes the next step, and repeats — sometimes for dozens or hundreds of iterations. Each cycle can change the agent's trajectory. If runtime governance only evaluates individual actions in isolation, it may miss the trajectory.

The plan-act-observe lifecycle defines three phases, each with different governance requirements:

Plan — The agent develops or revises its execution strategy. This is a governance checkpoint: the control plane evaluates whether planned actions fall within the agent's declared purpose, scoped authority, and action budget *before* resources are consumed. The initial plan establishes a baseline against which subsequent behavior is measured.

Act — The agent executes a step. The control plane evaluates not just "is this action authorized?" but "is this action consistent with the current plan?" and "does this action, in the context of all previous actions, remain within the agent's declared purpose?" Action counters track budget consumption, and the agent's position in its plan provides governance context — an agent at step 47 of a 7-step plan suggests plan deviation.

Observe — The agent processes results and decides what to do next. Plan revisions are governance events: the control plane captures changes and evaluates revised plans against the same criteria as the original. This creates a continuous governance loop that matches the continuous nature of agent execution.

Lifecycle governance may help detect failure modes that are difficult to observe through action-level evaluation alone: **plan deviation** (behavior diverges from declared plan), **goal drift** (effective goal shifts during execution), **scope creep** (incremental expansion through successive plan revisions), **runaway execution** (agent operating without converging on its goal), and **behavioral inconsistency** (different patterns in different lifecycle phases).



7. Trust-Gated MCP Server Discovery

Shows how agents discover and invoke MCP servers through a governed registry with trust states, capability attestation, and lease-based access.



8. Secrets as Capability Tokens

Shows the paradigm shift from agents holding credentials to agents receiving short-lived, purpose-bound, single-use capability tokens.



9. Human-in-the-Loop Escalation

Shows HITL as a designed operational mode with structured requests, time-bound approvals, and timeout handling.


Human Approver
Agent
Policy Decision Point
Escalation Manager
Audit Log
1
Authorize: action=deploy-to-production, intent=SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATION, risk=HIGH
2
ESCALATE — policy requires human approval for production deployments
3
Escalation request:
type: APPROVAL_REQUIRED
action: deploy-to-production
context: "Deploy updated pricing model v2.3"
risk_level: HIGH
impact: "Affects all customer-facing pricing"
alternatives: ["deploy to staging first", "schedule for maintenance window"]
timeout: 30 minutes
escalation_chain: [team-lead → VP Engineering]
4
Log: escalation_created, request_id=esc-442
5
PAUSE — agent cannot proceed without approval
6
Approval request (structured, all context included)
Human reviews: what will happen, why, what's the risk, what are alternatives
alt
[Approve]
7
APPROVE (with optional conditions)
8
Log: human_decision=APPROVE, human_id, timestamp
9
Approved — proceed with action
10
Re-authorize with human approval attached
11
PERMIT (human approval satisfies policy)
[Deny]
12
DENY (with reason)
13
Log: human_decision=DENY, reason, human_id
14
Denied — do not proceed
15
Re-plan using suggested alternatives
[Modify]
16
MODIFY: "Deploy to staging first, then production after verification"
17
Log: human_decision=MODIFY, modified_plan
18
Modified instructions
19
Re-plan with modified constraints
[Timeout (no response in 30 minutes)]
20
Timeout reached — escalate to next in chain
21
Log: escalation_timeout, escalating to VP Engineering
22
Escalated approval request (VP Engineering)
Agent remains PAUSED.
It does NOT proceed. It does NOT retry.
It does NOT work around the requirement.

10. Safe Failure Semantics

Agent failure is structurally different from traditional software failure. A service returns an error code; a function throws an exception; a process crashes and restarts. The failure is typically atomic, localized, and recoverable through established patterns. Agent failure introduces additional complexity. Agents may fail **mid-plan** — steps have already been completed, external systems have already been modified, and the overall intent behind the plan is incomplete. They may fail **across delegation boundaries** — sub-agents may still be executing on a plan that is no longer coherent. And they may fail **non-deterministically** — the conditions that caused the failure may not be reconstructable, because the agent's full context includes ephemeral model reasoning state and mutable external system state.

We suggest five failure semantics that may be worth considering for governed agent architectures:

(1) Closed — When uncertain, stop and escalate. Do not guess, do not retry with different parameters, do not attempt creative workarounds. This directly contradicts the default behavior of most AI systems — language models are designed to produce output, to try alternative approaches, to attempt workarounds. This is useful for conversational AI but may be problematic for governed enterprise agents. In this model, fail-closed is enforced by the control plane, not the agent — an architectural guarantee rather than a behavioral expectation.

(2) Visible — No silent failures. Every failure is logged with full governance context: which agent, what it was attempting, under what authority, at what lifecycle phase, what policy was being evaluated, and what state had been modified before the failure. A failure record that says "Agent X encountered an error" is insufficient. A record that says "Agent X (identity: claims-processor-7, intent: PROCESS_CLAIM, authority: grant-4491, lifecycle: ACT phase step 3/7, partial state: claim-record-8832 updated, payment-system not yet invoked)" is actionable.

(3) Bounded — Circuit breakers prevent cascading failures at three levels: agent-level (halt the agent before it produces more corrupted output), workflow-level (prevent downstream agents from consuming output of failed upstream agents), and system-level (detect anomalous failure patterns across the fleet). Critically, the "failure" being detected is not always a technical error — an agent that succeeds technically but produces governance-inappropriate output is also a failure that must be bounded.

(4) Reversible — Prefer operations with undo capability. Database changes should be transactional. State modifications should be journaled. External API calls should be sequenced so irreversible actions happen last. Irreversible actions (sending external communications, executing financial transactions, modifying production data) warrant stronger pre-execution

controls: additional policy checks, human approval requirements, or staged execution with confirmation gates.

(5) Graceful — Leave systems in a consistent, known state. No half-completed transactions, no orphaned resources, no corrupted data. Cleanup logic must be independent of the agent itself and triggered by the governance infrastructure. Memory state must be governed even in failure: session memory preserved for investigation, persistent memory not corrupted, shared memory contributions flagged as potentially incomplete.

Beyond these five semantics, we believe governed agent architectures benefit from **kill switches** at three levels — individual agent, agent group, and system-wide — all operating independently of the agents they terminate. An agent should not be able to prevent its own termination.

10.1. Fail-Closed, Circuit Breakers, and Kill Switches

Shows the three core failure response patterns: fail-closed on individual errors, circuit breakers on cascading failures, and kill switches for emergency termination.



10.2. Mid-Plan Failure with Graceful Cleanup and Delegation Cascade

Shows what happens when an agent fails mid-plan in a multi-agent workflow: partial state cleanup, delegation chain teardown, and the governance infrastructure ensuring systems are left in a consistent state.



11. Multi-Agent Coordination with Governance

Shows governed communication between agents with delegation chain propagation, scope narrowing, and full observability.

A2A Protocol Context: The A2A protocol provides the communication layer for this scenario — client agents dispatch tasks to remote agents, track progress, and receive artifacts. A2A's Communication Hub maps to the logged channel pattern below. As the protocol evolves, the community has an opportunity to consider governance extensions: delegation chain propagation at each handoff, scope narrowing between client and remote agents, and requirements for inter-agent communications to flow through audited channels. The risk of "authorization creep" — agents accumulating authority across systems without explicit, scoped delegation — has been identified as a concern in multi-agent deployments. The governance layer shown below illustrates one approach to addressing this.



12. Governed Memory and State

Shows how agent memory is classified, access-controlled, and subject to retention policies and deletion rights.



13. Prompt Injection Mitigation Through Architectural Defense

Prompt injection is frequently discussed as a model-level problem — adversarial inputs that manipulate an LLM into taking unintended actions. While model-level defenses (input filtering, output validation, instruction hierarchy) are valuable, we believe the more durable defense is architectural: designing the system so that a successful prompt injection cannot result in unauthorized action, even if the model is fully compromised.

The patterns presented throughout this document were not designed primarily as prompt injection defenses — they address the broader challenge of agent governance. However, taken together, they create multiple independent barriers that contain the blast radius of a successful

injection. We believe this "defense in depth" property is worth highlighting for the NCCoE community.

13.1. Architectural Barriers: Six Independent Defense Layers

The diagram below illustrates how a prompt injection attempt propagates through the governed architecture and is blocked at multiple independent layers — any one of which is sufficient to prevent unauthorized action.



13.2. Input/Output Guardrails: Policy-as-Code Content Validation

The architectural barriers above operate at the action level — after the LLM has already processed the injected input and proposed an action. A complementary defense operates earlier in the pipeline: a guardrails service that validates content *before* it reaches the LLM (input validation) and *after* the LLM generates a response (output filtering). This service uses policy-as-code (e.g., Rego/OPA) to apply deterministic pattern matching, content classification, and data redaction — providing a first line of defense that is independent of the model.



This two-layer approach — content-level guardrails *before* the LLM, and action-level governance *after* the LLM — creates defense at both the input and execution boundaries. The guardrails service is deterministic (Rego policy engine), independently deployable, and configurable through declarative YAML policies that can be updated without redeploying agents.

This architectural approach to prompt injection mitigation has several properties that may be useful for the NCCoE reference design:

- **Independence from model-level defenses.** The barriers operate outside the LLM and are not affected by model manipulation. Even if the model is fully compromised, the architectural barriers constrain what actions can be taken.

- **Defense in depth.** Multiple independent barriers — from content-level guardrails that block injection before it reaches the LLM, to action-level governance that prevents unauthorized execution after the LLM responds. Each barrier addresses a different aspect: content validation, action whitelisting, intent-action alignment, delegation chain scope, credential isolation, goal boundaries, and behavioral anomaly detection.
- **Containment over prevention.** Rather than attempting to prevent prompt injection (which may prove difficult to guarantee), this architecture focuses on containing its consequences. The blast radius of a successful injection is bounded by the agent's current authority grant, delegation scope, and goal boundaries.
- **Auditability.** Every blocked attempt is logged with full context, creating a forensic trail that supports incident investigation and pattern analysis across the fleet.

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14. Execution Lineage: Reconstructing How Agent Actions Happened

Traditional audit logs answer "what happened" — but in multi-agent systems, the critical question is "how did it happen?" When an AI agent accesses a customer database, security and compliance teams need to reconstruct the full chain: which human authorized it, which orchestrator delegated it, which worker executed it, which policy permitted it, and what intent was declared at each step.

Execution Lineage addresses this by introducing a tree-structured model where every agent action is a node connected by delegation, action, and resource-access edges. A canonical execution identifier propagates across service boundaries — from the governance proxy through the policy decision point to the credential broker — enabling forensic reconstruction of the complete execution chain from a single identifier.

The key architectural decisions in execution lineage are:

- **Correlation over coupling.** Each service writes its own lineage events using a shared execution identifier. There is no centralized write bottleneck — services emit independently, and the graph is reconstructed at query time.
- **Server-authoritative enrichment.** Trust state, delegation validity, and policy evaluation context are computed server-side and injected into the execution context. Client-provided values for these security-sensitive fields are stripped before enrichment, preventing context poisoning.

- **Graceful degradation.** Lineage headers are optional. Services that do not understand lineage ignore the headers. The execution tree has a gap but does not break. External APIs never see lineage headers — the governance proxy is the terminal observer.
- **Anomaly detection.** The lineage graph automatically flags suspicious patterns: broken chains (missing parent nodes), denied actions after allowed parent paths (defense-in-depth working but possibly misconfigured delegation), unusually deep delegation trees, and orphan executions with no associated policy decisions.

14.1. Lineage Propagation Across Service Boundaries

The following diagram illustrates how execution lineage context propagates through the governance proxy, policy decision point, and downstream services during a delegated multi-agent workflow.



Key design points:

- **Anti-spoofing at the proxy.** Response-only headers (trust state, policy decision ID) are stripped from inbound requests before any extraction occurs. The proxy never trusts client-asserted trust state.
- **Execution ID canonicalization.** The proxy validates the format of execution IDs (prefix + hex-safe UUID characters only). Malformed IDs are rejected and regenerated — preventing injection of path traversal, null bytes, or log-poisoning characters.
- **Header stripping on upstream.** All governance headers are removed before the request reaches external APIs. The governance proxy is the trust boundary — external services never see lineage metadata.
- **Lineage-aware policy evaluation.** The policy decision point enriches the authorization context with execution depth, delegation chain validity, and agent trust state before Cedar policy evaluation. Policies can reference these fields: for example, *"deny database access unless delegation chain depth ≤ 2"* or *"require human approval for chains involving agents with trust level below 5."*

14.2. Lineage Graph Reconstruction and Anomaly Detection

Given persisted execution records and audit events, the lineage graph can be reconstructed for forensic analysis, compliance reporting, and real-time anomaly detection.



Anomaly detection patterns:

Pattern	Significance	Recommended Response
Broken chain	Parent execution referenced but not found in lineage data	Investigate: data loss, race condition, or cross-boundary propagation failure
Denied after allowed parent	Sub-agent denied when its parent's execution was allowed	Review: defense-in-depth working correctly, or misconfigured delegation scope
Deep delegation	Execution chain depth exceeds threshold (e.g., >4 hops)	Audit: verify deep nesting is intentional and not an uncontrolled recursion
Multiple sibling delegations	Unusual fan-out from a single parent (e.g., >5 children)	Monitor: may indicate runaway orchestrator or parallelized batch operation
Orphan execution	Execution record with no associated policy decisions	Investigate: execution created but evaluation never completed

Forensic reconstruction query: Given any execution identifier, the lineage store supports a recursive query that returns the complete tree: every delegation hop, every agent identity, every declared intent, every policy decision, every resource access — from the originating user through the full delegation chain to the terminal action. This enables compliance teams to answer *"how did this happen?"* for any agent action, within seconds.

Standards consideration: We suggest the community discuss how execution lineage identifiers should relate to existing distributed tracing standards (W3C Trace Context, OpenTelemetry). A bridge between agent execution lineage and infrastructure observability traces would enable end-to-end visibility from the human user's browser through the agent orchestrator to the downstream API response — connecting application-level governance with infrastructure-level observability.

Mapping Diagrams to NIST Areas of Interest

NIST Area of Interest	Diagrams That Address It	Key Concepts Demonstrated
Identification	Diagram 1 (End-to-End), Diagram 2 (Agent Identity Lifecycle), Diagram 2 (Delegation)	Agent registry, infrastructure discovery, multi-tier agent framework detection, cryptographic attestation (Ed25519), SCIM-based identity provisioning/deprovisioning, lease-based trust with heartbeat, delta-based registry updates, SPIFFE/SVID, agent metadata (id, type, version, owner, framework)
Authorization	Diagram 3a (Intent-Based AuthZ), Diagram 3b (Intent Transitions), Diagram 4a (Control Plane Core), Diagram 4b (Proxy + SDK), Diagram 5 (Plan-Act-Observe)	Purpose/goal/intent declarations, intent taxonomy, intent-action mismatch detection, goal-scoped authorization, intent transitions as governance checkpoints, lifecycle-aware policy evaluation, plan deviation and scope creep detection, deterministic validation, policy-as-code, AuthZEN PDP/PEP, governance proxy, governance SDK, fail-closed semantics
Access Delegation	Diagram 2 (Delegation Chains), Diagram 10 (Multi-Agent)	Cryptographic delegation chains, scope narrowing, chain validation, multi-hop delegation. A2A protocol provides agent-to-agent task delegation; governance extensions for chain-of-custody and scope narrowing may benefit from community discussion
Logging & Transparency	All diagrams (AUD participant in every flow), Diagram 5 (Plan-Act-Observe), Diagram 19 (Execution Lineage Propagation), Diagram 20 (Lineage Graph Reconstruction)	Three-level observability, lifecycle-aware audit trails, plan capture and revision tracking, delegation chain in audit records, intent logging, decision rationale, **execution lineage**: tree-structured audit model with cross-service correlation, anomaly detection, and forensic reconstruction
Data Flow Tracking	Diagram 11 (Governed Memory), Diagram 7 (Secrets)	Memory classification, tenant isolation, provenance tracking, capability tokens
Prompt Injection	Diagram 4a (Control Plane), Diagram 4b (Proxy	Two-layer defense: content-level guardrails (policy-as-code input validation, PII redaction,

	+ SDK), Diagram 13a (Architectural Barriers), Diagram 13b (Input/Output Guardrails)	system prompt leak prevention) and action-level governance (action whitelisting, intent-action mismatch, delegation scope, credential isolation, goal boundaries, behavioral detection). Containment over prevention — blast radius bounded by current authority grant

Standards Mapping

Architectural Component	Standards Referenced
Agent Identity	SPIFFE/SPIRE (workload identity), OIDC (authentication), SCIM (lifecycle provisioning/deprovisioning), Ed25519 (cryptographic attestation), MCP protocol probing (capability discovery)
Authorization	OAuth 2.0/2.1 (token-based), AuthZEN (PDP/PEP API), NGAC (attribute-based)
Delegation	OIDC-A (delegation chains), OAuth token exchange, A2A (agent-to-agent task delegation)
Policy Enforcement	AuthZEN (standardized PDP API), OPA/Cedar/NGAC (policy languages)
Tool & Agent Protocol Governance	MCP (agent-to-tool connectivity), A2A (agent-to-agent connectivity); governance extensions for both may warrant community discussion
Secrets	NISTIR 8587 (token protection), SPIFFE (workload attestation)
Audit & Lineage	SP 800-92 (log management), NIST CSF (detect function), W3C Trace Context (distributed tracing correlation), OpenTelemetry (observability bridge)
Zero Trust	SP 800-207 (Zero Trust Architecture)

About Watchlight AI

Watchlight AI focuses on Agent Runtime Governance — the discipline of enforcing identity, authorization, policy, and audit continuously during agent execution. Our work centers on helping enterprises assess agent governance maturity, identify runtime policy gaps, and build governed agent operations.

The architectural patterns in this document draw from a governance framework of 12 principles organized across three layers: Foundations (identity, purpose, authority), Execution (control planes, lifecycle, human oversight, policy), and Operations (memory, observability, failure, tools, multi-agent coordination). This framework is informed by our experience but is offered here as a contribution to the broader conversation, not as a prescriptive standard.

We would be grateful for the opportunity to collaborate with NIST NCCoE on this project. The challenges of agent identity and authorization are significant, and we believe the best solutions will emerge from the kind of cross-sector collaboration that the NCCoE fosters. We look forward to learning from other participants and refining these ideas together.

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